The errors of desperation

The spin is a serious mistake, but it comes from a chain of events that are important to understand. Leclerc’s spin on the last lap of the Miami Grand Prix was certainly not a good moment for the Monegasque and Ferrari fans. There is no doubt that the error of the driver who up to that point had held third position in the race compromised not so much the position on the podium but rather the entire result of the race, with the addition of the penalty imposed by the stewards after the finish which relegated the SF26 number 16 from a potential podium to a disappointing eighth position. Leclerc rightly took all the blame and we are not here to absolve him: the mistake is there and it is serious. But in our opinion it is interesting to dig a little deeper into what happened and why Leclerc ended up making that type of mistake. The good first part of the race Leclerc’s race had certainly started under the best of auspices: a good start and then a brilliant intuition at turn 1 had put Ferrari in the lead of the race, and in the early stages of the race, Leclerc’s leadership had not been put particularly under pressure, with the Monegasque’s good ability to gain crucial meters in driving which kept his opponents at a distance on the long straights, protecting him from an attack. However, the problems came with the Safety Car and throughout the subsequent phase. The entry of the safety car in fact put Norris and Antonelli very close to Leclerc again who found himself in a vulnerable position, especially on the straight. The main difference was that when the opponents had the possibility of using the overtake mode they passed without problems, while when Ferrari had this option the overtaking was not achieved because the straight line speed was not sufficient. Not only this, the tire factor must also be taken into consideration: in a strenuous attempt to maximize the performance (in itself very good) of the SF26 in the driven sections, Leclerc was forced to use his set of medium tires a lot, eventually finding himself, by force of circumstances, with tires that were now more worn than those of McLaren and Mercedes, and starting to accumulate a gap. The pit gone wrong The pit stop, quite early, then added further frustration to the driver. The Ferrari wall decided to stop early to defend its position on Russell. Leclerc, who was in charge at the time, did not appreciate the choice very much, as it was not shared with him, but there is more in this case too: the bad pit stop (3.7 seconds) of the Maranello mechanics (usually very good, but this time they made a major mistake) ruined the plan to defend the position, so Leclerc found himself with a very long stint to complete and still behind the Mercedes number 63. The small turbine and the problems “in the background” Russell’s problems on the Miami track still allowed Leclerc, after a long series of attempts, to get the better of the Englishman and gain a minimal margin over him on the track, but compared to the leaders the pace was no longer there. As the race progressed, the Ferrari pace gradually became further away from the Mercedes-powered ones, and this can be explained first and foremost with the issue of the engine’s smaller turbine: as the cars became lighter, the initial advantage of the smaller turbo became more and more of a disadvantage, with straight-line performance increasingly lacking compared to the best, especially in traction. The new rules that had just come into force, combined with a track layout that did not undermine the electrical part of the power units, highlighted the differences in the combustion engines, and the Ferrari propulsion unit was increasingly in difficulty. Just look at the ranking, with 7 Mercedes-powered cars in the top 10 and the Williams in points ahead of the Haas to realize that the engine factor was decisive. Leclerc also spoke in the interview about “background factors to manage”, without specifying what they were. It seems easy to understand that it was always something related to the Power Unit and what has been told so far. Overtaking Verstappen with the first tactical invention Having arrived behind Verstappen, Leclerc definitely had more pace, given the much newer set of tires and his SF26 which performed better in corners, but the problem remained the performance in a straight line: that of the Red Bull was decidedly excellent, that of the Ferrari was decidedly poor. And so here is Leclerc’s first invention: instead of forcing an attack under braking, with Verstappen certainly not the easiest driver to pass under braking, Leclerc does not use the overtake mode and relative energy in the long back straight. He also closes his wings well before braking, all to conserve as much energy as possible to discharge in the sprint towards the finish line, where Verstappen would have had fewer weapons to defend himself and, above all, would not have been able to counterattack immediately. The tactic is risky but it works and Leclerc takes the position over his rival and 4-time world champion at the end of lap 47. Now between him and the podium there remains the problem of the incoming Piastri, with a McLaren that is decidedly in form. The invention on Piastri and the mistake Once caught by Piastri Leclerc quickly realizes that keeping the McLaren behind until the finish is almost impossible, because the difference in performance on the straight is too large. He therefore decides to try an all-out tactic to secure the third step of the podium: Leclerc’s idea is to let Piastri pass on the penultimate lap and then stay close to him and have the possibility of using the overtake mode (the extra power that goes to those who follow less than a second by regulation) and play his chances on the last lap with this option. And so on the back straight he puts his plan into action, lifting his foot off the accelerator early, so as to close his wings and let the Australian’s McLaren pass. However, the problem arrives in the last meters of the lap: the papaya car has great traction and once passed it leaves Leclerc on the spot who sees Piastri’s rear end quickly moving away. The Monegasque tries desperately to stay close to him in order to then launch the attack, given that if he leaves the second gap everything becomes useless. Coming out of turn 3 he tries to dump some of his stored power onto the ground but he overdoes it and ends up losing the rear and crashing. From then on, the last lap becomes an ordeal with the damaged car practically no longer able to steer to the right, which is why Leclerc cuts all the corners on the track in an attempt to somehow reach the finish line. Overall, considering some risks taken and the contact with Russell, the penalty honestly does not appear particularly exaggerated. To be saved, no, to be understood, yes. Seeing everything that happened, it is clear that Leclerc’s mistake was his and that all this led to a probable fourth place becoming an eighth, with important points left by the wayside. As said at the beginning, we are not here to save Leclerc from his sins, but it is difficult not to understand the frustration of the driver who from leading the race found himself totally unable to defend himself against the competition, except by inventing imaginative tactics that sometimes pay off and sometimes instead become bad mistakes.

Automobile Magazine – F1 English News
2026-05-04 20:30:00